IRELAND, C.J.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in the Superior Court, claiming that the defendants wrongfully subjected them to a mandatory furlough plan that was ordered by the Governor. A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to offer a valid statutory basis to challenge the implementation of the furlough plan, we affirm.

Facts and background. The essential facts are not in dispute. On October 15, 2009, the Governor, acting on his authority pursuant to G. L. c. 29, § 9C, announced a mandatory furlough plan that required all managerial employees in the executive branch to take a prescribed number of unpaid furlough days during fiscal year 2010.3 The division of human resources (division) of the Executive Office for Administration and Finance subsequently issued a memorandum to affected agencies that provided guidelines to determine whether an employee was to be considered a "manager" for purposes of the furlough plan. Pursuant to the division's guidelines, the Department of State Police (State police) determined that "manager" encompassed all uniformed officers holding the rank of lieutenant and higher.

In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, and injunctive relief, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 65, 365 Mass. 832 (1974), alleging that, pursuant to the public employees collective bargaining statute, G. L. c. 150E, § 1, they were incorrectly identified as "managers," and, therefore, the furlough plan was improperly imposed on them. They also sought monetary relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, alleging that the furlough plan deprived them of "earned" wages.

The defendants moved to dismiss, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), on the grounds that G. L. c. 150E provided the plaintiffs with no cause of action to obtain the requested relief, and that the plaintiffs' argument pursuant to G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, failed as a matter of law. A nonevidentiary hearing was held in June, 2010. During the hearing, the plaintiffs additionally alleged that the deprivation of "earned" wages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 148, violated their entitlement to a set salary pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 28A. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs did not have a valid cause of action because none of the statutes on which the plaintiffs relied applied to the furlough plan. The plaintiffs appealed.

Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo." Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), citing Harhen v. Brown, 431 Mass. 838, 845 (2000). "We accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff." Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., supra, citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47 (1998). "We consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient, as a matter of law, to state a recognized cause of action or claim, and whether such allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 374 (2012), citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

The plaintiffs argue, as they did below, that G. L. c. 150E provides them with the statutory basis to seek declaratory relief against the application of the furlough plan. The plaintiffs also invoke G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, and G. L. c. 22C, § 28A, to seek monetary reimbursement for wages lost because of the furlough plan. The defendants argue that the statutes on which the plaintiffs rely do not furnish the plaintiffs with any valid cause of action. We agree.

1. Declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 150E. At oral argument, the plaintiffs conceded that they do not have explicit rights pursuant to G. L. c. 150E. Those statutory rights and protections are limited to officers below the rank of lieutenant; the statute does not cover the plaintiff lieutenants and captains here.4 See G. L. c. 150E, § 3 ("bargaining unit in ... the state police shall be all such uniformed members in titles below the rank of lieutenant").

Nevertheless, they assert that they have a cause of action pursuant to G. L. c. 150E to challenge the implementation of the furlough plan. They argue, in essence, that the purpose of the statute is to establish the rights, rules, and obligations of all public employees and employers. Therefore, they contend that the definition of "managerial employees" pursuant to G. L. 150E, § 1, applies to them as public employees, and the defendants violated the statute by defining "manager" in a manner different from G. L. c. 150E, § 1. We are not persuaded.

In order for a court to entertain a petition for declaratory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, a plaintiff must, in relevant part, "demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure [the] resolution [of an actual controversy]." Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292 (1977). However, G. L. c. 231A, by itself, does not provide an independent statutory basis for standing.5 Indeck Me. Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, 454 Mass. 511, 516-517 (2009), citing Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000). To establish standing, the alleged injury must be "within the area of concern" of the statute. Indeck Me. Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, supra at 517, quoting Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra at 293.

"We decide whether standing exists by examining several considerations, including the language of the statute [and] the Legislature's intent and purpose in enacting [it]...." Indeck Me. Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, supra at 517-518, citing Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, supra at 135-136. See Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 426 Mass. 541, 543 (1998) ("a clear legislative intent is necessary to infer a private cause of action from a statute"). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of G. L. c. 150E, § 3, the statute excludes from its scope of protection State police officers whose rank is lieutenant or captain.6

In addition, although the definition of "manager" in the division's guidelines contains some similarity to the definition of "managerial employees,"7 pursuant to the plain language of G. L. c. 150E, § 1, the definition of "managerial employees" is applicable only to G. L. c. 150E.8 Moreover, the statute protects the rights of public employees specifically to self-organize and to bargain collectively. See G. L. c. 150E, § 2. As the judge noted in her written decision, there is nothing in G. L. c. 150E to suggest that the Legislature intended to incorporate any and all issues affecting public employees or the terms of their employment in its purview, much less to constrain the executive branch's discretion regarding state budgets and furlough plans pursuant to G. L. c. 29, § 9C. In short, the plaintiffs' claims do not come within the "`zone of interests' arguably protected by" G. L. c. 150E. Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, supra at 135, quoting Penal Insts. Comm'r for Suffolk County v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 (1981).9 There was no error.10

2. Monetary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 148, and G. L. c. 22C, § 28A. Employers are required to pay "earned" wages to their employees, and employees have a cause of action to recover wages wrongfully withheld. G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.11 The plaintiffs claim that their rank of lieutenant or captain gives them the right to payment of a set salary pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 28A,12 and that this right falls within the meaning of "earned" wages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 148. In essence, they argue that they have a property interest in their salary pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 28A, which the furlough plan violated by depriving them of their "earned" wages.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs misinterpret G. L. c. 149, § 148, arguing that the right to payment of "earned" wages is secured by virtue of work or service actually performed. They further argue that, in the circumstances here, the plaintiffs did not "earn[]" the money to which they claim they are entitled pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 28A, because the furlough plan applied prospectively and did not force the plaintiffs to forfeit retrospectively any wages "earned" from days they had already worked. We agree.13

The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that G. L. c. 22C, § 28A, confers a property interest in their salary, or that the word "earned," for purposes of G. L. c. 149, § 148, incorporates future payments of their salary pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 28A. We have held that Commonwealth at-will employees, like the plaintiffs, "do[] not have a property interest in future wages (for future services) for which the Commonwealth has decided not to pay"; rather, they have a "mere expectation as to payment from the Commonwealth for future services" (emphasis added). German v. Commonwealth, 410 Mass. 445, 450-451 (1991). See Administrative Justice of the Hous. Court Dep't v. Commissioner of Admin., 391 Mass. 198, 204 n.4 (1984) ("plaintiff can have no property right or interest in his public salary or public office").

In addition, although the word "earned" pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 148, is not defined, its plain and ordinary meaning is "[t]o acquire by labor, service or performance." Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484, 492 (2011), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 584 (9th ed. 2009). "Where an employee has completed the labor, service, or performance required of him, therefore, according to common parlance and understanding he has `earned' his wage" (emphasis added). Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., supra. Accordingly, we conclude that a prospective reduction in the number of days to be worked does not deprive the plaintiffs of any wages "earned." In these circumstances, the plaintiffs do not fall within the "`zone of interests' arguably protected by" G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150. Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, supra.

Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the judge properly dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.

Judgment affirmed.